by Danila Bochkarev
In December 2025, the EU agreed on a ban on all Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, with the legislation expected to enter into force in January 2026. Whether or not this law will be challenged by dissatisfied member states such as Hungary or Slovakia, it will have a significant impact on the European gas market. In any case, it is likely to increase interest in importing additional pipeline gas from alternative sources.
By Irina Mironova for Cedigaz
The absence of a consistent Suez-area facility limits operational flexibility and is one of the structural gaps in the global LNG bunkering map. Egypt’s latest plan for an LNG liquefaction and bunkering facility in Port Said revives an earlier ambition to build a marine-fuel hub at the Suez Canal – this time positioned within a more mature LNG bunkering market but remains subject to the same operational and geopolitical uncertainties that likely prevented earlier proposals from advancing.
By Irina Mironova for Cedigaz
Russia’s gas trade with China continued to evolve in 2025, demonstrating a growing structural reliance on the Chinese market across both pipeline and LNG channels. While recent political signals – including the Power of Siberia 2 memorandum at the SCO Summit and the direct deliveries from Arctic LNG 2 to China’s Beihai LNG terminal – attracted considerable attention, the underlying trade data point to a more nuanced picture. China’s LNG imports from Russia rose seasonally in September, in line with typical autumn patterns rather than representing a record-breaking surge, and cumulative LNG deliveries over January–October remained lower year-on-year. This dynamic highlights an increasingly asymmetric relationship: Russia is becoming more dependent on China to absorb redirected pipeline gas and discounted LNG, whereas for Beijing, LNG continues to serve a flexible balancing role, with limited structural growth in underlying demand.